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Abstract. From 09.10.05 to 14.10.05, the Dagstuhl Seminar 05411 Anony-
mous Communication and its Applications was held in the International
Conference and Research Center (IBFI), Schloss Dagstuhl. During the
seminar, several participants presented their current research, and on-
going work and open problems were discussed. Abstracts of the presen-
tations given during the seminar as well as abstracts of seminar results
and ideas are put together in this paper. The ﬁrst section describes the
seminar topics and goals in general. Links to extended abstracts or full
papers are provided, if available.
Keywords. Anonymous Communication, Cryptography, Privacy, Secu-
rity, Anonymity
Traﬃc analysis without direct observations
George Danezis (University of Leuven, B)
Anonymity system designers have traditionally tried to prevent global passive ob-
servers from linking communicating parties. Yet recently some proposed anony-
mous channels only protect from partial observers and assume that no real-world
adversary can be powerful enough to observe all communications. We consider
the challenge facing an adversary performing traﬃc analysis without having a
direct view of the totality of the network. We show that the anonymity system
can provide enough 'services' to this adversary to still be susceptible to some
tracing, and present two attacks: one that degrades the anonymity of The Onion
Router (Tor), and one that breaks the anonymity of a scheme based on universal
re-encryption.
Keywords: Anonymity, Traﬃc analysis
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Improving the Decoding Eﬃciency of Private Search
George Danezis (University of Leuven, B)
We show two ways of recovering all matching documents, in the Ostrovsky et
al. Private Search, while requiring considerably shorter buﬀers. Both schemes
rely on the fact that documents colliding in a buﬀer position provide the sum of
their plaintexts. Eﬀcient decoding algorithms can make use of this property to
recover documents never present alone in a buﬀer position.
Keywords: Private search, private information retrieval, cryptography
Full Paper: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2006/482
Anonymity Metrics Revisited
Claudia Diaz (University of Leuven, B)
In 2001, two information theoretic anonymity metrics were proposed: the "eﬀec-
tive anonymity set size" and the "degree of anonymity". In this talk, we propose
an abstract model for a general anonymity system which is consistent with the
deﬁnition of anonymity on which the metrics are based. We revisit entropy-based
anonymity metrics, and we apply them to Crowds, a practical anonymity system.
We discuss the diﬀerences between the two metrics and the results obtained in
the example.
Keywords: Anonymity, metrics, entropy
Full Paper: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2006/483
Tor: An Internet Anonymous Communication System
Roger Dingledine (The Free Haven Project)
What do the United States Department of Defense and the Electronic Frontier
Foundation have in common? They are both funding the development of Tor
(tor.eﬀ.org), a free-software onion routing network that helps people around the
world use the Internet in safety.
The public Tor network has over 250 servers on six continents, and averages
over 100Mbit/s of traﬃc. Our users include ordinary citizens who want protection
from identity theft and prying corporations, corporations who want to look at a
competitor's website in private, and soldiers and aid workers in the Middle East
who need to contact their home servers without fear of physical harm.
I'll give an overview of the Tor architecture, and talk about why you'd want
to use it, what security it provides, and how user applications interface to it.
Then we can start talking about whether Tor's free-route topology provides a
good trade-oﬀ in terms of security and ﬂexibility.
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Research questions for Tor, or, Anonymity Problems I
want solved
Roger Dingledine (The Free Haven Project )
Over the past few years we have begun to investigate such hard questions as
how to quantify the level of security an anonymity system provides in various
contexts and conﬁgurations. We have also begun to develop and deploy real
anonymity networks, such as Tor and JAP. What are the next research steps in
understanding anonymity, and what answers do we need before we can move on
to building better deployed systems?
This talk has two parts. First we present the near-future questions we're ask-
ing and investigating right now, and then we present the longer-term questions
that will likely require substantial changes or entirely new designs.
On Extractors, Error-Correction and Hiding All Partial
Information
Yevgeniy Dodis (Courant Institute - New York, USA)
Randomness extractors allow one to obtain nearly perfect randomness from
highly imperfect sources randomness, which are only known to contain "scat-
tered" entropy. Not surprisingly, such extractors have found numerous appli-
cations in many areas of computer science including cryptography. Aside from
extracting randomness, a less known usage of extractors comes from the fact
that they hide all deterministic functions of their (high-entropy) input: in other
words, extractors provide certain level of privacy for the imperfect source that
they use. In the latter kind of applications, one typically needs extra properties
of extractors, such as invertibility, collision-resistance or error-correction.
In this abstract we survey some of such usages of extractors, concentrating on
several recent results by the speaker. The primitives we will survey include sev-
eral ﬂavors of randomness extractors, entropically secure encryption and perfect
one-way hash functions. The main technical tools will include several variants
of the leftover hash lemma, error correcting codes, and the connection between
randomness extraction and hiding all partial information.
The copy of the survey can be found at http://theory.lcs.mit.edu/ yevgen/ps/ent-
survey.ps
Keywords: Randomness extractors, biometrics, entropic security, fuzzy extrac-
tors, secure sketches, hiding all functions, error-correction
Full Paper:
http://theory.lcs.mit.edu/∼yevgen/ps/ent-survey.ps
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Anonymity and Beyond
Shlomi Dolev (Ben Gurion University, IL)
The talk summarizes three recent works:
 Buses for Anonymous Message Delivery (with Amos Beimel, J. Cryptology
2003).
 Polygonal Broadcast, Secret Maturity and the Firing Sensors, (With Ted
Herman and Limor Lahiani, Add-Hoc Networks Journal 2005).
 Magnifying Computing Gaps (with Ephraim Korach and Galit Uzan, sub-
mitted).
Anonymous communication is achieved by using ﬁxed routing and scheduling
of buses (messages) that carry encrypted messages (seats) from every source
to every destination. One such scheme uses a single bus with O(n2) seats that
traverse the network using an Euler tour. Here there is only one message but the
delay is O(n).
The other extreme is when we have 2|E| buses, two buses for each link,
traversing the link in opposite directions. A bus of an edge have seats for every
source destination pair that choose the edge as part of their shortest path. Here
there O(|E|) messages but the transmission time is optimal. We present a cluster
based schemes that trade time with communication. We also use random walk
to cope with dynamic changes.
The second work is in the domain of sensor networks. The problem of si-
multaneous activation is considered where a captured sensor should not reveal
the up-coming activity even during the time the encrypted command is distrib-
uted. Thus, the sensor should not know the nature of the command before it
has to execute it. Unidirectional communication of satellite is used. The satellite
repeatedly broadcasts public key and after a period of time larger than the com-
mand ﬂooding time the satellite broadcasts the coupled private key. A sensor
that would like to send an activation command, encrypts the command using a
public key received from the satellite and ﬂood the system with the encrypted
command. When the sensors receive the satellite broadcast with the coupled
private key they simultaneous reveal the command and act accordingly.
The third work scope is unidirectional encryption. Consider two, not necessar-
ily identical, computationally powerful machines connected by a unidirectional
communication link that should transfer a long stream of information in the
presence of listening adversary that is slightly weaker. We present schemes that
enhance the computation strength gap of the combinatorial exhaustive testing
machines and the adversary. In other words, the gap between the amount of
information decrypted by the adversary and the information decrypted by the
receiver grows with time.
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Abstracts and Slides
Stefan Köpsell (TU Dresden, D)
Abstract "AN.ON  a real world anonymity service"
The talk presents a real implementation of a public available anonymity
service called AN.ON. The goals, fundamental architecture and the protocol
details will be explained. At the end current research tasks will be introduced.
Abstract "Social Impacts of Anonymity Systems  more than Crime"
If one thinks about the impacts of anonymity systems on society one often
thinks of child pornography, terrorism or at least crime at large. Of course this
kind of impact exists and so the talk will focus on that problem. But the talk
will also show that the problem is not that big as one may think it could be. Ad-
ditional the talk will give at leas one example for a completely diﬀerent inﬂuence
on society.
Abstract "Challenges in real world anonymity systems"
There exist many theoretical approaches for anonymous communication in
computer networks since more than two decades  like Chaum's Mixes, the
DC-Net, Broadcast, Private Message Service, ISDN Mixes etc. But building an
anonymous communication system for the real world is much more than sim-
ply implementing these theoretical approaches. One problem is that these ap-
proaches are based on their very own models of the world, i.e. models for the
underlying communication infrastructure, models of the behaviour and incen-
tives of senders and receives etc. As these models do not adequately describe the
real world one has two possibilities:
 try to change the real world so that it ﬁts to the model  to the best of my
knowledge this seems to be unrealistic at the moment
 change the model so that it better reﬂects the real world
The later one has many implications on the proposed solutions for anonymous
communication. This talk tries to spotlight some of the arising problems hope-
fully leading to a discussion about solutions.
Keywords: Anonymous communication
A Formal Treatment of Onion Routing
Anna Lysyanskaya (Brown Univ. - Providence, USA)
Anonymous channels are necessary for a multitude of privacy-protecting proto-
cols. Onion routing is the best known way to achieve anonymity in practice. The
idea of onion routing is to wrap a message in several layers of encryption and
then route it through a path of randomly selected intermediate nodes.
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Each node peels oﬀ a layer of encryption and forwards the resulting cipher-
text to the next node. This process is repeated until all layers are removed. In
the process, each intermediate router on the path must ﬁnd out its two adja-
cent routers, but the protocol must conceal all other information. The informal
security requirement is that, by the time the message arrives at destination,
its origins are impossible to trace, even if some of the routers on the path are
maliciously trying to identify its originator. Despite substantial implementation
eﬀorts, the cryptographic aspects of onion routing had not been suﬃciently ex-
plored prior to our work. No satisfactory deﬁnitions of security had been given,
and prior constructions have only had ad-hoc security analysis for the most part.
We provide a formal deﬁnition of onion-routing and then give an eﬃcient
and easy to implement onion routing scheme satisfying this deﬁnition in the
PKI model.
Joint work of: Lysyanskaya, Anna; Camenisch, Jan
Full Paper:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/11535218_11
See also: Appeared in Crypto 2005
Privacy of Statistical Databases and Sensitivity of
Functions
Kobbi Nissim (Ben Gurion University, IL)
Consider a trusted server that holds a database of sensitive information. The
server would like to reveal global statistics about the population in the database,
and yet hide information speciﬁc to individuals. These are conﬂicting goals. Ex-
actly how these goals are deﬁned, and what tradeoﬀs exist between them, is the
focus of this paper. These questions are complementary to the design of secure
function evaluation protocols; the goal here is to decide which functionalities are
actually safe to learn. We describe a new framework for releasing noisy functions
of the database while provably satisfying a strong deﬁnition of privacy. We de-
ﬁne the sensitivity of a function, roughly, the amount that any single argument
to the function can change its output, and show how adding noise proportional
to the sensitivity is suﬃcient to preserve privacy. This framework improves on
recent work of Blum et al. [?], in two ways: (i) a much richer set of queries is
allowed, and (ii) for several functions, a signiﬁcantly lower noise level is needed
for proving privacy.
Our second main contribution is a separation between the power of interactive
and non-interactive privacy mechanisms. We show that for any non-interactive
mechanism S satisfying our deﬁnition of privacy, there exist low-sensitivity func-
tions f which cannot be approximated at all based on S(x), unless the database
is very largeexponential in the number of attributes. In other words, when the
data is complex, a non-interactive mechanism must be tailored to suit certain
functions to the exclusion of others.
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Finally, we present privacy deﬁnitions modeled after the notions of indistin-
guishability, semantic security, and simulation, and explain their equivalence.
These deﬁnitions simplify those of previous work.
Cryptography from Anonymity
Rafail Ostrovsky (Univ. California - Los Angeles, USA)
Hiding one's identity is often easier than hiding one's secrets. In particular, the
goal of anonymity becomes easier to achieve when the number of users in the
system grows, whereas satisfactory solutions to the problem of privacy (as in the
context of secure multi-party computation) become expensive when the number
of users is large.
We suggest a novel approach for obtaining information-theoretic privacy and
security by relying on anonymous (but non-private) communication as a building
block. Our results go in two directions:
 Feasibility. We show that the non-private anonymity functionality can be
used to implement unconditionally secure point-to-point channels, as well as
secure multi-party computation as long as less than half of the players are
corrupted.
 Eﬃciency.We show that anonymous channels can yield dramatic eﬃciency
improvement for several natural secure computation tasks. In particular,
we present the ﬁrst solution to the problem of private information retrieval
(PIR) which can handle multiple users while being (essentially) optimal with
respect to both communication and computation.
Joint work of: Ishai, Yuval; Kushilevitz, Eyal; Sahai, Amit, Ostrovsky, Rafail
Cryptography from Anonymity
Rafail Ostrovsky (Univ. California - Los Angeles, USA)
There is a vast body of work on implementing anonymous communication. In
this paper, we study the possibility of using anonymous communication as a
building block, and show that one can leverage on anonymity in a variety of
cryptographic contexts. Our results go in two directions.
Feasibility. We show that anonymous communication over insecure channels
can be used to implement unconditionally secure point-to-point channels, broad-
cast, and generalmulti-party protocols that remain unconditionally secure as long
as less than half of the players are maliciously corrupted.
Eﬃciency. We show that anonymous channels can yield substantial eﬃciency
improvements for several natural secure computation tasks. In particular, we
present the ﬁrst solution to the problem of private information retrieval (PIR)
which can handle multiple users while being close to optimal with respect to
both communication and computation.
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Joint work of: Ishai, Yuval; Kushilevitz, Eyal; Sahai, Amit; Ostrovsky, Rafail
Full Paper:
http://www.cs.ucla.edu/∼rafail/PUBLIC/75.html
Private Searching On Streaming Data
Rafail Ostrovsky (Univ. California - Los Angeles, USA)
In this talk, I will describe the problem of private searching on streaming data,
where we can eﬃciently implement searching for documents under a secret cri-
teria (such as presence or absence of a hidden combination of hidden keywords)
under various cryptographic assumptions. The result can be viewed in a variety
of ways: as a generalization of the notion of a Private Information Retrieval (to
the more general queries and to a streaming environment as well as to public-key
program obfuscation); as positive results on privacy-preserving data mining; and
as a delegation of hidden program computation to other machines.
Joint work of: Ostrovsky, Rafail; Skeith, William
History of anonymity
Andreas Pﬁtzmann (TU Dresden, D)
Paul Baran stated in 1964, if you have a centrally trusted party, you can achieve
nearly everything (e.g. conﬁdentiality, anonymity, unobservability, ...) using link-
encryption and dummy traﬃc.
In 1981, David Chaum published the ﬁrst approach how to achieve anonymity
and unobservability as well as pseudonyms and voting without central trust, i.e.
it is enough to trust any 1 out of n parties, called MIXes. The base technology
is asymmetric cryptography, so security is computational at best.
In 1985, David Chaum published solutions for anonymous communication
(DC net), payment, and credentials, when the privacy properties are uncondi-
tional, i.e. provable in Claude Shannon's work of information theory.
Around 1990, MIXes and DC net have been pushed to their limits, i.e. as
secure as can be, by Michael Waidner, Birgit Pﬁtzmann, and myself.
But in reality, systems work with quite weaker security, since usability (in-
cluding delay and throughput) are essential to attract users - and without users,
there is no anonymity.
So for the future, I hope to see theory and practice to meet.
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Upper and Lower Bounds on Black-Box Steganography
Leonid Reyzin (Boston University, USA)
We study the limitations of steganography when the sender is not using any prop-
erties of the underlying channel beyond its entropy and the ability to sample from
it. On the negative side, we show that the number of samples the sender must
obtain from the channel is exponential in the rate of the stegosystem. On the
positive side, we present the ﬁrst secret-key stegosystem that essentially matches
this lower bound regardless of the entropy of the underlying channel. Further-
more, for high-entropy channels, we present the ﬁrst secret-key stegosystem that
matches this lower bound statelessly (i.e., without requiring synchronized state
between sender and receiver).
Keywords: Steganography, information hiding
Joint work of: Dedi¢, Nenad; Itkis, Gene; Reyzin, Leonid; Russell, Scott
Full Paper:
http://www.cs.bu.edu/∼reyzin/bbstego.html
See also: TCC 2005
Private Communication in a Dark Network
Oskar Sandberg (Chalmers - Göteborg, S)
This talk explores a diﬀerent way to protect the privacy of participants and
publishers on the Internet. Rather than attempting to build a mixing network,
we build a "Dark network" (or "Friend to Friend" network) where users only
reveal there identity to trusted friends, and yet can communicate with anybody
in the network. We achieve this by exploring methods of using models of the
"small world phenomenon" to route in social networks.
Keywords: Darknet, freenet, small world
Enhancing the security od perfect blind DL-signatures
Claus Peter Schnorr (Universität Frankfurt, D)
We enhance the security of Schnorr blind signatures against the novelone-more-
forgery of Schnorr andWagner which is possible even if the discrete logarithm
is hard to compute. We show two limitations of this attack. Firstly, replacing
the group G by the s-fold direct product G×s increases the work of the attack,
for a given number of signer interactions, to the s-power while increasing the
work of the blind signature protocol merely by a factor s. Secondly, we bound
the number of additional signatures per signer interaction that can be eﬃciently
forged by known methods. That fraction of the additional forged signatures can
be made arbitrarily small. Our security proofs assume both the random oracle
and the generic group model.
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Message Splitting and Intersection Attacks
Andrei Serjantov (The Free Haven Project )
First, we introduced the intersection attack which is the loss of anonymity re-
sulting from observing a pattern of repeated communication of a sender to a
set of users which is a subset of all possible recipients of messages. We discuss
exact and probabilistic versions of this attack brieﬂy and show that it is eﬀective
against any anonymous channel, powerful and diﬃcult to protect against.
In the second part of the talk, we look at how the situation changes if we
consider a weaker adversary model in which the attacker is not able to observe
all of the sender's traﬃc (or equivalently all the entry nodes). The sender is then
able to split her traﬃc across entry nodes and reduce the eﬀectiveness of the
intersection attack.
Finally, we look at the fundamental tradeoﬀ between delay and anonymity,
show that this issue is necessary to consider in the design of any anonymity
system and argue that this choice is currently made in an ad-hoc fashion. Instead,
we advocate empirical studies as a way of tailoring the anonymity system to
requirements of users and discuss possible problems with this approach.
A Brief History of Onion Routing
Paul Syverson (Naval Research - Washington, USA)
In this talk, I brieﬂy sketched the history of the US Naval Research Lobora-
tory's Onion Routing Program from 1995 to 2005. Onion Routing networks
are application-independent systems for low-latency communication resistant
to traﬃc analysis, e.g., web traﬃc, remote login, IRC chat, etc. The goal of
Onion Routing has always been to separate identiﬁcation and authentication
from routing.
There have been three generations of Onion Routing that can be roughly
characterized as follows.
Generation 0:
Basic system establishing route/circuit using an "onion" consisting of lay-
ers of public-key encryption eﬀectively wrapped around nothing, and used to
distribute symmetric keys used for passing data in both directions. Fixed ﬁve
hop routes. Static network topology. Initial rendezvous service design linking
two anonymous parties. Access to hidden location using reply onions. Slides de-
scribing the generation 0 design (with some generation 1 elements) available at
http://www.onion-router.net/Publications.html#old-slides Also in those slides:
rendezvous for IRC chat, applications to cell phones, private location tracking
of active badge systems. Oﬃcial plans to distribute code in order to leverage
security of open source leading to and based on wider adoption from the be-
ginning of the ﬁrst project, before the phrase "open source" had been coined.
(First publication release of code was given July 1996.) A publicly accessible
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prototype generation 0 system ran at NRL continuously from about late 1996
to January 2000. Publishing c. 50K connections per day over its last year from
tens of thousands of IP addresses the world over.
Generation 1:
Clients are separated from routers and can be run at locations other than
at routers. Variable entrance conﬁgurations and variable exit policies added.
Mixing added to processing of cells (uniform-size data packets). Variable length
routes. Separate crypto modules capable of running on dedicated hardware (and
facilitates exportability in the legal environment of the day). Flat distribution
of topology and linkstate information via database engine modules. Plan for
smoothing of data rates via padding and limiting to reduce eﬀectiveness of traﬃc
analysis. A breakdown of the generation 1 modules is given at http://www.onion-
router.net/Archives/TNG.html Several generation 1 test systems were deployed
with up to c. a dozen nodes distributed across the US and Canada, but were not
made publicly accessible.
Generation 2:
Tor (Tor's Onion Routing). Circuits built incrementally to permit use of
ephemeral Diﬃe-Hellman (forward anonymity). Thus, onions per se are gone, al-
though layering and separation of public-key circuit establishment from symmetric-
key data passing remains. Design and implementation of hidden services via
rendezvous points. Abandonment of any thought that mixing or padding are
currently of use in low-latency systems. Leveraging of now widely used SOCKS
protocol allows abandoning of most application-speciﬁc proxies that were needed
in generation 1. Integrity checking. Congestion control. Multiple application
streams on a single circuit. Directory servers to control network membership
and maintain node status information. Ability for application traﬃc to exit cir-
cuits at any point (leaky pipes). Slides on the Tor design and project status as of
mid 2004 can be found at http://www.onion-router.net/Publications.html#new-
slides
The Tor network was the ﬁrst version of Onion Routing not designed entirely
by Naval Research Lab personnel. It was designed jointly with the Free Haven
Project (http:
freehaven.net), under contract to NRL. The Tor network became operational
in October 2003, and has never been down, as of this writing. It has grown
to a present network in October 2005 of about 250 nodes on every continent
but Antarctica with an estimated user base in the hundreds of thousands. (The
design hides the exact number.) It was named one of the 100 best products of
2005 by PC World. Support for Tor development and maintainance was provided
by the EFF from late 2004 to late 2005.
More details about the history of Onion Routing can be found at
http://www.onion-router.net/History.html
This work is the result of input from many people. Primary contributors to
generations 0 and 1 Onion Routing besides myself are David M. Goldschlag and
Michael G. Reed. Primary contributors to generation 2 Onion Routing are Roger
Dingledine and Nick Mathewson.
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(Note that the presentation on Onion Routing by Lysyankaya in this Dagstuhl
seminar introduces an entirely diﬀerent use of the term from how we have been
using it for the last decade. A central aspect of our Onion Routing is that
public-key is used only to establish a circuit. Actual messages are never sent
using public-key. Also, our Onion Routing is bidirectional. Once a circuit is es-
tablished, symmetric-key is used to protect data ﬂowing in both directions.
Finally, Onion Routing derives anonymity primarily from unpredictability of
routing. There is no mixing assumed to be taking place.)
Universal Re-encryption for Mixnets
Paul Syverson (Naval Research - Washington, USA)
We introduce a new cryptographic technique that we call universal re-encryption.
A conventional cryptosystem that permits re-encryption, such as ElGamal, does
so only for a player with knowledge of the public key corresponding to a given
ciphertext. In contrast, universal re-encryption can be done without knowl-
edge of public keys. We propose an asymmetric cryptosystem with universal
re-encryption that is half as eﬃcient as standard ElGamal in terms of computa-
tion and storage.
While technically and conceptually simple, universal re-encryption leads to
new types of functionality in mixnet architectures. Conventional mixnets are
often called upon to enable players to communicate with one another through
channels that are externally anonymous, i.e., that hide information permitting
traﬃc-analysis. Universal re-encryption lets us construct a mixnet of this kind
in which servers hold no public or private keying material, and may therefore
dispense with the cumbersome requirements of key generation, key distribution,
and private-key management. We describe two practical mixnet constructions,
one involving asymmetric input ciphertexts, and another with hybrid-ciphertext
inputs.
Joint work of: Golle, Philippe; Jakobsson, Markus; Juels, Ari; Syverson, Paul
Provable Anonymity Against Traﬃc Analysis
Amnon Ta-Shma (Tel Aviv University, IL)
With the advent of peer to peer networks, anonymity is grasped as a desired
property of any well designed system for exchanging information between par-
ties. This work focuses on unlinkability, which is one of the possible types of
anonymity.
Rackoﬀ and Simon proved the unlinkability of an eﬃcient variant of David
Chaum's classic protocol for anonymous data communication, and proved that
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it is secure against adaptive adversaries. Their protocol is round eﬃcient, but
not message eﬃcient (all players have to play at all rounds).
We show that if the attack model is somewhat relaxed (the adversary may
control most but not all of the communication links) than one can replace node-
mixing with layer mixing, and prove another variant of Chaunm's protocol is
anonymous even when honest players play only when they want to send a mes-
sage. Thus, our protocol is also message eﬃcient.
Our main tool is information Theory. We use this connection to prove the
protocol is anonymous even when the adversary has prior information. We are
not aware of any previous work achieving that, and we believe the ability to deal
with prior information is crucial for achieving anonymity in realistic applications.
Keywords: Anonymity, unlinkability, traﬃc analysis, node-mixing, layer-mixing
Joint work of: Berman, Ron; Fiat, Amos; Ta-Shma, Amnon
Full Paper:
http://www.springerlink.com/content/qvknd1d83hpur96j/?p=
6a646068c5454ca3ba5202be439f4cf4&pi=3
See also: International Conference on Financial, pages 266-280, 2004
Oblivious Information Delivery using Oblivious
Signature-Based Envelopes
Gene Tsudik (Univ. of California - Irvine, USA)
Secure, anonymous and unobservable communication is becoming increasingly
important due to the gradual erosion of privacy in many aspects of everyday life.
This prompts the need for various anonymity- and privacy-enhancing techniques,
e.g., group signatures, anonymous e-cash and secret handshakes.
In this work we investigate an interesting and practical cryptographic con-
struct  Oblivious Signature-Based Envelopes (OSBEs) recently introduced by
Li, et al. (PODC'03). OSBEs are very useful in anonymous communication since
they allow a sender to communicate information to a receiver such that the re-
ceiver's rights (or roles) are unknown to the sender. At the same time, a receiver
can obtain the information only if it is authorized to access it. This makes OSBEs
a natural ﬁt for anonymity-oriented and privacy-preserving applications, such as
Automated Trust Negotiation and Oblivious Subscriptions. Our work focuses on
the ElGamal signature family: we succeed in constructing practical and secure
OSBE schemes for several well-known signature schemes. Our schemes are more
eﬃcient than previous techniques and are practical in the true meaning of the
word.
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Keywords: Anonymity, secret handshakes, untracaeability, privacy, authenti-
cation
Joint work of: Tsudik, Gene; Nasserian, Samad
A Flexible Framework for Secret Handshakes or
How to Achieve Multi-Party Interactive Anonymous
Authentication
Gene Tsudik (Univ. of California - Irvine, USA)
In the society increasingly concerned with the erosion of privacy, privacy-preserving
techniques are becoming very important.
Secret handshakes oﬀer anonymous and unobservable authentication and
serve as an important tool in the arsenal of privacy-preserving techniques.
Relevant prior research focused on 2-party secret handshakes with one-time
credentials, whereby two parties establish a secure, anonymous and unobservable
communication channel only if they are members of the same group.
This paper breaks new ground on two accounts: (1) it shows how to obtain
secure and eﬃcient secret handshakes with reusable credentials, and (2) it pro-
vides the ﬁrst treatment of multi-party secret handshakes, whereby m>2 parties
establish a secure, anonymous and unobservable communication channel if they
all belong to the same group. An interesting new issue encountered in multi-
party secret handshakes is the need to ensure that all parties are indeed distinct.
(This is a real challenge since the parties cannot expose their identities.) We
tackle this and other challenging issues in constructing GCD  a ﬂexible secret
handshake framework. GCD can be viewed as a compiler" that transforms three
main building blocks: (1) a Group signature scheme, (2) a Centralized group key
distribution scheme, and (3) a Distributed group key agreement scheme, into a
secure multi-party secret handshake scheme.
The proposed framework lends itself to multiple practical instantiations, and
oﬀers several novel and appealing features such as self-distinction and strong
anonymity with reusable credentials. In addition to describing the motivation
and step-by-step construction of the framework, this work provides a security
analysis and illustrates several concrete framework instantiations.
Keywords: Secret handshakes, multi-party protocols, anonymity, untraceability,
authentication
Joint work of: Tsudik, Gene; Xu, Shouhuai
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Private Approximation of Search Problems
Enav Weinreb (Ben Gurion University, IL)
Many approximation algorithms have been presented in the last decades for hard
search problem. In cryptographic applications, it is desired to design algorithms
which do not leak unnecessary information. Speciﬁcally, we are interested in
private approximation algorithms - eﬃcient algorithms whose output does not
leak information not implied by the optimal solutions to the search problems.
Known approximation algorithms usually leak a lot of information.
In this talk I will discuss how to deﬁne private approximation of search
problems, I will present some impossibility results for the vertex cover problem,
and I will describe some private algorithms that leak little information for MAX-
3SAT.
Joint work of: Beimel, Amos; Carmi, Paz; Nissim, Kobbi; Weinreb, Enaw
